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Affordability Boards — The States’ New Fix for Drug Pricing
Tara Sklar, J.D., M.P.H., and Christopher Robertson, J.D., Ph.D.
The States’ New Fix for Drug Pricing

O

n April 8, 2019, Maryland’s General Assembly passed a law creating a prescription-drug
affordability board to help the state regulate
drug prices. This policy, which took effect on July 1,

2019, requires drug manufacturers
to justify high prices or price
spikes for both patented and generic drugs. If the board rejects
a manufacturer’s explanation for a
pricing decision, it can, with the
approval of the state legislature,
set a lower price for the drug.
This approach represents a
more direct attack on prescriptiondrug prices than the wave of 45
cost-control bills passed by 28
states in 2018. Such efforts focused largely on regulating and
licensing pharmacy benefit managers and prohibiting them from
keeping pharmacists from informing patients about lower-priced options.1 Similarly, California’s drugtransparency law, which went
into effect in 2018, was hailed as
one of the most transformative

pieces of health legislation in the
country. But that law requires
drug makers only to provide notice before they raise prices above
certain thresholds; it doesn’t directly regulate prices.
The Maryland law, and the
model law on which it is based,
go further by permitting payment
limits. Such a mechanism is uncommon in the United States,
although precedents exist, including policies permitting state boards
to cap the cost of electricity, carinsurance premiums, and hospital rates — domains in which
policymakers have found that
competition alone may not protect the public from extremely
high prices. From a global perspective, many countries limit
how much they pay for prescrip-
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tion drugs by negotiating prices
and implementing national formularies and price ceilings.2
Maryland’s law was originally
intended to apply to all payers,
including commercial plans, but
it was amended just before passage to apply only to health plans
that serve employees of the state
government and of county and
city governments. Although this
change dramatically narrows the
scope of the law, it helped limit
political opposition and may improve the law’s prospects in the
courts.
Maryland has attempted to regulate drug prices before. In 2017,
the state passed the Anti–PriceGouging Act to prohibit unconscionable price increases, but the
federal Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals struck down the law as
unconstitutional on the grounds
that it interfered with interstate
commerce, which is the exclusive
domain of the federal government.3 In early 2019, the U.S. Su-
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preme Court refused to hear the
state’s appeal, thus sealing the
law’s fate. Unlike the price-gouging legislation, the new Maryland
law doesn’t regulate commerce —
it simply allows the state to decide
how it spends its own money.
State lawmakers thus avoided the
legal problems that plagued the
prior bill.
We believe that the new law is
a harbinger of what’s to come in
drug-pricing legislation. During
the 2019 legislative session, eight
additional states introduced bills
that would create drug-cost commissions. Legislation is pending
in half these states, failed in three
states, and recently passed in
Maine. Maine’s affordability board
act was part of a four-bill prescription-drug–reform package and is
less detailed in its approach than
the Maryland law. Like Maryland,
Maine limits its board’s scope to
state, county, and local government health plans.
The Maryland law and other
state bills call for a cost review
only when prices or price increases for certain drugs exceed specified thresholds. They create
boards or commissions of five to
nine people who would range
from elected officials to members
of the public and establish larger
advisory or stakeholder councils
composed of patient representatives, payers, providers, and pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Most state bills trigger board
review for patented drugs when
drugs enter the market with a
wholesale acquisition cost of at
least $30,000 per year or treatment course or undergo a price
hike of at least 10%, $10,000, or
$3,000 within 1 year, depending
on the state. For generic medications, board review is generally
triggered when a drug costs
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$3,000 or more per year or has
increased in price by 25% or
$300 for a 30-day supply within a
1-year period. Maryland is one of
a minority of states that use lower
thresholds.
There is an important third
trigger for review that the Maryland law and most state bills include, which functions as a catchall. Beyond the specified price
triggers, a board can review any
prescription drug when it determines that the drug creates affordability challenges for the state
health care system and patients.
The pending state bills generally grant affordability boards
broad authority to establish new
reimbursement levels for reviewed
drugs after determining that a
given price or price increase is
justifiable using information provided by the manufacturer, including information on research
and development costs and prices
elsewhere. Maryland’s law, however, takes a more conservative
approach. Maryland’s board reports its determinations to the
state’s legislative policy committee, and the committee then has
45 days to approve the board’s
proposed reimbursement rate. If it
doesn’t approve the rate, the board
then submits its proposal to the
governor and state attorney general. Maryland’s board cannot set
a payment limit without approval
of the legislative policy committee or the governor and state attorney general.4 Drug manufactures are required to accept the
price set by the board in order to
sell the drug in question to state,
county, and local government
plans operating in Maryland.
Similarly, Maine’s board isn’t
authorized to set spending caps;
rather, it provides recommendations on spending targets for
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drugs to the joint standing committee of the legislature. These
limited powers call into question
how effective affordability boards
will be at reducing costs, even for
public payers. They also reflect a
concern among some state legislators — which the drug industry
has reinforced — that such boards
may ultimately reduce access to
certain cutting-edge drugs. Maryland also limits its board’s authority to regulate the prices of drugs
that are in short supply, which
therefore preserves access to essential medications, regardless
of cost.
Such provisions reflect the fact
that Maryland has relatively little
bargaining power; companies
could simply walk away from the
market, rather than set a precedent for other payers by selling
certain drugs at prices below current levels. States may need to
act collectively to simultaneously
drive down prices and ensure access to drugs. The current consolidated state of the pharmaceutical industry, in which many
drug makers face little or no direct competition, exploits the fragmentation of the states.
Still, we believe that such efforts by state legislators represent laudable experiments to address a recognized problem. State
drug-pricing reform efforts are
building on each other; many of
the bills proposing drug-cost review boards also incorporate elements from price-transparency
laws. For example, under Maryland’s law and the bills introduced in other states, drug manufacturers have the opportunity to
explain prices or price increases
as part of the review process.
Price-transparency laws have thus
far withstood legal challenges
from the drug industry claiming
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that they interfere with interstate
commerce and violate the First
and Fourteenth Amendments.5
California’s law has reportedly
had some success, as drug companies have decided to rescind
or reduce previously announced
price increases for health plans
in that state. Establishing affordability boards may be a natural
next step that more states take to
exert a stronger inAn audio interview
fluence over price
with Prof. Sklar is
spikes and still suravailable at NEJM.org
vive legal challenges.
The challenge facing any statelevel effort will be to achieve the

kind of scale necessary to affect
an industry that manufactures
more than 4 billion prescriptions’
worth of drugs each year for the
United States alone. These new
approaches are unlikely to be a
substitute for a federal solution
that alters the fundamental market factors responsible for driving
up drug prices.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors
are available at NEJM.org.
From the University of Arizona James E.
Rogers College of Law.
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Colleagues Unknown — How Peer Evaluation Could Enhance
the Referral Process
Gregory E. Brisson, M.D.

M

y email was written in good
faith, but still the subject
was delicate. I was looking for a
specialist who would be a good
fit for my patient, an anxious
gentleman who required extra
time at office visits to get answers to his many questions. He
had seen my go-to consultant in
this specialty, a seasoned physician with a gentle bedside manner. That visit had not gone well.
Whatever the reasons, he wanted
a new doctor. Rather than blindly
referring him to any available physician in the division, I emailed a
cadre of colleagues to get their
recommendations.
They didn’t have any. Their
experience with the division in
question was as limited as mine.
I considered resending the email
to the entire general-medicine
mailing list, but I had concerns
about maintaining confidential-

ity, and physicians’ mailboxes are
already inundated. Instead, I contacted a specialist who was new
to the system. She could see the
patient the next day, though he
would have to drive an hour to the
city where her clinic was located.
He agreed. With the expectations
of both parties managed, the
visit went smoothly.
Finding patient-centered solutions has always been one of the
challenges and rewards of clinical medicine, but stories like this
one are becoming routine. I regularly receive emails from peers
who need help navigating the
system. Colleagues at other institutions describe similar experiences. These observations raise
questions about how doctors refer and shed light on the reality
that generalists and specialists
increasingly don’t know each
other. It’s now the norm for U.S.
n engl j med 381;14 nejm.org

physicians to work in large groups
— networks that can span counties or cross state lines.1 In such
systems, there’s little opportunity
for interaction among colleagues.
It wasn’t always this way. Earlier in my career, I knew most of
the doctors at my hospital. I was
generally aware of who was kind,
curious, and a good collaborator
— qualities I value in consultants.
When I made a referral, it was
usually to someone I knew firsthand whom I could trust. That
started to change in the past
decade.
The group I work for merged
with several hospitals and grew
from hundreds of physicians to
thousands — I can’t possibly
know them all, no matter how
many meet-and-greet socials I attend. Hospitalist programs inflamed the problem by disconnecting generalists from hospitals,
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